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Abstract At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have
tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia—i.e. acting, or having a disposition
to act, contrary to one’s judgments about what is best for one to do. However, there
has been some recent debate about whether this captures the ordinary notion of
weakness of will. Richard Holton claims that it doesn’t, while Alfred Mele argues
that, to a certain extent, it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about an ordinary
concept here is one apt for empirical investigation. We evaluate Mele’s studies and
report some experiments of our own in order to investigate what in the world the
ordinary concept of weakness of will is. We conclude that neither Mele nor Holton
(previously) was quite right and offer a tentative proposal of our own: the ordinary
notion is more like a prototype or cluster concept whose application is affected by a
variety of factors.
Keywords Akrasia  Weakness of will  Intention  Resolution 
Experimental philosophy  Prototype concepts  Knobe effect
1 Introduction
How should we understand weakness of will? Some years ago one of the present
authors published a paper arguing that the philosophical discussion had run together
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two quite distinct notions (Holton 1999).1 The first is the idea of acting contrary to
one’s best judgement—the idea that is to the fore in classical discussions of akrasia.
The second is the idea of over-readily revising a resolution. It is plausible that the
two typically go together: in acting contrary to their best judgments, agents will
typically over-readily revise their resolutions; and conversely, in over-readily
revising their resolutions they will typically act contrary to their best judgments. So
it is understandable that the two ideas have been conflated. But nevertheless they are
clearly distinct.
Holton could have rested content with pointing out the distinction and getting
clear on the ideas involved. Rashly though, he went further. He claimed that it is just
the second idea, the idea of over-ready resolution revision, that corresponds to our
ordinary notion of weakness of will. The idea of acting contrary to one’s best
judgment he took to be a philosopher’s invention, best labeled with the
philosopher’s proprietary term ‘‘akrasia.’’
He should have known better.2 Whilst the claim enabled him to formulate his
position in a neat slogan—weakness of will is not akrasia—it left him open to
empirical refutation. For the nature of our ordinary concepts is, at least to some
degree, an empirical question; and he had done no real empirical work to
substantiate what he was saying. Not that it seemed that such work was needed at
the time. Even 10 years ago the analysis of ordinary concepts was a leisurely affair,
conducted largely by reflection, and the casual interrogation of colleagues, friends
and students. Now, however, it is an altogether more rigorous business, and in a
recent paper Mele (2010) has used the survey method that has become the hallmark
of experimental philosophy to argue that Holton was wrong. As we understand him,
Mele claims that the ordinary notion of weakness of will is disjunctive—one
exhibits weakness of will either by acting contrary to one’s evaluative judgment or
by acting contrary to one’s plan. On this view, Holton should not have been so
restrictive.
Our project is to shed light on what in the world the concept of weakness of will
is. Is there an ordinary notion here? If so, is it disjunctive as Mele contends?
Employing some empirical methods ourselves, we argue that neither the traditional
account of weakness of will, nor Holton’s, nor Mele’s, is quite right. Indeed, our
findings suggest that no simple account phrased in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions will do the job. The ordinary notion of weakness of will is more like a
prototype or cluster concept. There are core cases that possess a number of features.
As these features are removed, people are less inclined to describe the resulting
cases as ones of weakness of will. Akrasia and resolution-violation are indeed
among these features. However, neither is sufficient on its own for an ascription of
weakness of will; and other features also play a role, such as the moral valence of
the action.
1 A lightly revised version appears as ch. 4 of Holton (2009).
2 In fact it seems that he did: ‘‘the English language is a plastic instrument’’ he wrote; ‘‘is it not very
likely that the traditional account captures one of our uses of the expression?’’ But he then went on to say
that he couldn’t help thinking that the traditional account was straight-out wrong (pp. 257–258). He
should have tried harder to resist.
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2 Mele’s case against Holton
In ‘‘Intention and Weakness of Will’’ (1999), Holton argues that the ordinary
concept of weakness of will essentially involves the violation of a certain kind of
intention—a resolution. ‘‘Resolution’’ is something of a technical term for Holton; it
refers to an intention or plan one has to stick to a certain course of action in the face
of the temptation to succumb.3 For example, consider a smoker who sincerely
admits it isn’t best for her to continue smoking cigarettes but nevertheless doesn’t
plan to quit; she recognizes the detrimental effects of smoking but doesn’t resolve to
quit in spite of her evaluative judgment. Such a person is clearly being akratic. After
all, ‘‘akrasia’’ is a term of art, and this person is by hypothesis acting contrary to
what she thinks is best for her to do. But is she acting in a weak-willed manner? Is
she displaying weakness of will?4 Holton claimed not. For him, agents display
weakness of will only if they violate a resolution.5 To get a case of weakness of will
then, the smoker would have to resolve to quit, but then succumb to temptation and
continue. Akrasia and violations of resolutions often come and go together—we
often resolve to do what we think is best for us to do—but they can come apart. Call
this the resolution account of weakness of will.
In a recent paper, Mele (2010) argues that the ordinary concept of weakness of
will involves both the notion of akratic action and the notion of intention-violation.
Building on earlier work, Mele distinguishes an agent’s ‘‘evaluative commitments’’
(roughly their judgements about which action would be best) from their ‘‘executive
commitments’’ (roughly their resolutions). He holds that there are ‘‘traditional’’ or
‘‘orthodox’’ versions of akrasia that involve violations of one’s evaluative
commitments; but that there are also ‘‘nontraditional’’ or ‘‘unorthodox’’ versions
of akrasia, that involve violations of one’s executive commitments. After
summarizing his earlier work, Mele writes:
I did not offer full-blown analyses of akratic and enkratic action. Instead I
offered sketches of conceptions of both kinds of action designed to
accommodate traditional and nontraditional species of them. Are these
sketches hopelessly flawed? (p. 394)
3 It seems pretty close to the ordinary usage (consider a New Year’s resolution to quit smoking). But
we’ll avoid making any further unsubstantiated empirical claims. Note too that the notion of temptation in
play here is potentially broader than the ordinary use. We might not, for example, say that a stranded
climber with his arm stuck between two rocks is tempted not to cut his arm off. But insofar as he resolves
to cut off his arm partly to resist the urge not to, he is ‘‘tempted’’ in the relevant sense.
4 Mele takes weakness of will to be a character trait. We don’t want to dispute that claim here. To avoid
conflict, we will follow Mele and simply say in such cases that the person ‘‘exhibits’’ or ‘‘displays’’
weakness of will (or akrasia) or is acting in a weak-willed manner (or being akratic).
5 We say ‘‘only if’’ because Holton thinks violating a resolution isn’t sufficient for being weak-willed—
one must also do so unreasonably. In one formulation, Holton writes that weakness of will (or action
displaying it) is ‘‘unreasonable revision of a contrary inclination defeating intention (a resolution) in
response to the pressure of those very inclinations’’ (2009, p. 78). Since the debate between Mele and
Holton doesn’t revolve around this normative element, we won’t focus on it in this paper and will often
leave it out in characterizing Holton’s view.
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Mele’s answer to his own question is a very definite ‘‘no.’’ But the question that he
has posed is a rather odd one, for the notions of akratic and enkratic action are
philosophical terms of art. There may be an interesting question of how other
theorists have used them, but this doesn’t seem to be all that Mele is doing. Rather
his primary focus seems to be on providing concepts that will help with the
understanding of human behavior. So our tentative interpretation is that Mele thinks
the account of akrasia he provides will be the most fruitful.
So far then there is no substantial issue between Mele and Holton. Disagreement
comes with Mele’s next claim, that our ordinary notion of weakness of will is the
same as his conception of akrasia. As he puts it: ‘‘weakness of will can be displayed
both in acting contrary to an evaluative commitment and in acting contrary to an
executive commitment’’ (p. 397).
The fact that Mele only provides a ‘‘sketch’’ of the nature of akrasia makes it a
little hard to see just what his account of the ordinary notion of weakness of will is.
But his talk of the two species of akrasia suggests that he thinks they belong to one
genus, so that one can be akratic by instantiating either one or the other. Equating
akrasia with weakness of will thus gives us a disjunctive account of the latter: one
shows weakness of will either by violating one’s evaluative commitments (acting
against one’s best judgments) or by violating one’s executive commitments (acting
against one’s resolutions). Here then we have a clear disagreement with Holton,
who took weakness of will to consist just in the second disjunct.
To support this claim, Mele reports several empirical studies he conducted on the
matter. The first two involve asking ordinary people (university students) what
‘‘weakness of will’’ means to them. In the first study, Mele asks his subjects to
define what they mean by it. He reports that while only ‘‘eleven of the students
(about 15%) mentioned doing something one knew or believed one should not do…
only one student (about 1.4%) mentioned doing something one chose, decided,
intended, or resolved not to do’’ (p. 396), In the second study, rather than giving
them free rein, Mele asks his subjects to choose between three options:
A. Doing something you believed or knew you shouldn’t do (for example, going
to a party even though you believed it would be better to stay home and study).
B. Doing something you decided or intended not to do (for example, going to a
party even though you decided to stay home and study).
C. Neither. The descriptions are equally accurate or inaccurate.
The results were that ‘‘49% gave the believed/knew response; 33% gave the
decided/intended response; and 18% gave the third response’’ (p. 396). Mele
contends that the results of these first two studies provide some evidence against
Holton’s resolution account and provide some evidence in favor of his own view.
This is effective as an ad hominem response to Holton, who himself made a claim
about how ordinary people would gloss the idea of weakness of will. But let us
pause to consider how much weight we should put on these two studies in
elucidating the ordinary notion. In attempting to discover whether violating a
resolution is more central to the ordinary notion of weakness of will, should we rely
on the theoretical principles that ordinary people articulate in brief experimental
conditions? The methodological trend among experimental philosophers has not
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been to do so; they have appealed instead to people’s application of a particular term
or concept. This is because ordinary people are assumed to be rather good at
recognizing when a certain ordinary concept (given that they possess it) applies in
concrete cases, but not so good at recognizing the abstract principles that govern the
application of these concepts. It is the role of the theorist to articulate the principles
given the judgments of those who possess the concept. (Compare the practice of
linguists, who place weight only on the concrete grammatical judgments of their
subjects, not on their subjects’ theories of grammar.) There may be something to be
gained from examining how the folk articulate what they think does or does not
count as displaying weakness of will. But we should put very little weight on such
responses, especially when the issues are subtle.
Mele does move to more standard methods in his latter two studies. In Study 3,
he asked subjects to make a judgment about a case in which judgment-violation and
resolution-violation come apart. The scenario is adapted from one Mele has
discussed in the past:
Joe believes that it would be best to quit smoking cigarettes. He is thinking
again—this time on New Year’s Eve—about when to quit. He knows that
quitting will be hard and unless he picks a good time to start he will fail. Joe
judges that it would be best to smoke his last cigarette tonight and to be smoke
free from then on. When he reports this to Jill, his wife, she asks whether this
is his New Year’s resolution. He says, ‘‘Not yet. I haven’t yet actually decided
to quit. Making that decision will be hard. To make it, I’ll really have to psych
myself up. I’ve been smoking for forty years. I believe I can quit, but I would
definitely miss smoking.’’ In the end, Joe fails to decide to quit smoking.
Tomorrow, he smokes less than usual, but he has his first cigarette minutes
after he awakes, as always. However, he could have decided to quit, and if he
had he would have quit. (p. 401, n. 9)
Subjects were then asked to report on a Likert scale their degree of agreement or
disagreement with the following claim: ‘‘Joe displays some weakness of will in this
story.’’ Given that in the story Joe acts against his best judgment but doesn’t violate
a resolution (since he doesn’t ever intend to quit), Holton’s hypothesis should make
predictions about subjects’ responses that differ from those of Mele’s disjunctive
view. Holton should predict that participants will tend to disagree with the claim
while Mele should predict that they will tend to agree. Scoring ‘‘strongly agree’’ as 1
and ‘‘strongly disagree’’ as 7, the mean response was 2.68 (between ‘‘moderately
agree’’ and ‘‘slightly agree’’). As Mele reports, 80% agreed with the assertion (by
providing a response of 1, 2, or 3), yet only 16% disagreed (providing a response of
5, 6, or 7). Mele contends that this counts against Holton’s view: ‘‘this is evidence
that an ordinary notion of weakness of will is such that Joe counts as displaying
weakness of will—even though he does not act contrary to an intention. What he
does act contrary to is his better judgment’’ (p. 402).
However, there are three serious worries here. First, there is a reasonable way to
read the scenario so that it does contain a resolution-violation. After all, Joe appears
to think he should decide to quit and that he is steeling himself for it. Joe says:
‘‘I haven’t yet actually decided to quit. Making that decision will be hard. To make it,
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I’ll really have to psych myself up.’’ It may appear to some readers that Joe has
resolved to decide to quit (a sort of second-order intention): he is forming an
intention to make the official decision to plan on quitting. And this appears to be a
resolution, as opposed to just an intention, because he is clearly anticipating that he
will be tempted not to stick to his second-order intention. As he says, the decision
will be hard and he’ll have to ‘‘psych himself up.’’ This sounds much more like the
smoker who has a first-order resolution to quit than the merely akratic smoker who
judges quitting to be the best option but just isn’t moved to do what is best. If this is
right, a significant number of Mele’s subjects may have agreed that Joe displays
weakness of will in the vignette, but only because they were picking up on the
reading on which he is violating a resolution, albeit a second-order one. If Mele had
asked subjects whether they agreed with the claim that Joe displays weakness of will
specifically in failing to quit smoking, this wouldn’t be much of a problem.
However, he asked them about their agreement with a more general claim (‘‘Joe
displays some weakness of will in this story’’) which can apply to the relevant
second-order resolution.
The second problem concerns the wording of the question that Mele asked.
Subjects were asked whether Joe showed some weakness of will. That might be an
effective question if one were only concerned with refuting the letter of Holton’s
earlier account. Suppose though that Holton was right in thinking that the core issue
in weakness of will is resolution-violation; judgment-violation has some role to
play, but a comparatively minor one. That would be in the spirit of Holton’s
account. In such a case, though, subjects might still accept that Joe showed some
weakness of will; the claim is, after all, a very weak one.
The final problem with Mele’s third study is that the result differs markedly from
a similar one he conducted (‘‘Study 3a’’ n. 10, p. 402). Here Mele varied the
dependent measure, asking participants to report their degree of agreement with a
slightly different claim: ‘‘Joe does not display any weakness of will in this story.’’
Now, this is the negation of Mele’s original claim, so one would expect to get a
result that is the mirror image of the earlier one: disagreement in Study 3 should be
matched by agreement in Study 3a. However, in this subsequent study disagreement
had fallen to 58% (compared to 80% agreement prior), whilst agreement was up to
38% (compared to 16% disagreement prior). As Mele notes, this result is
disconcerting. Still, he takes comfort in the fact that a majority in each study (80%
in one, 58% in the other) provided a response that is not in accord with Holton’s
view, even though Study 3a did not yield a strong majority. But a discrepancy of
this magnitude should make us worry that something is going wrong.
Realizing the uncertainty surrounding these studies, Mele conducted one more
(Study 4) in an attempt to replicate the results of Study 3 while using a slightly
different way of measuring responses. Using the same scenario involving Joe above,
Mele asked subjects to respond with ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’ to the question: ‘‘Does Joe
display any weakness of will in this story?’’ A large majority (73%) answered in the
affirmative, seemingly providing more evidence against Holton’s view. But the first
two worries about Study 3 apply here as well. Given that the story is the same, some
participants may have read Joe as violating a second-order resolution. Furthermore,
in answering ‘‘Yes,’’ they are committed to a very weak claim—namely, that Joe
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displays some weakness of will. It’s not surprising that a large majority of people
opted for saying ‘‘Yes,’’ especially given such a forced, dichotomous choice.
While Mele concludes that Holton’s view is discredited and his disjunctive
account is well-supported, the worries we have raised here call out for further
investigation. So we conducted three experiments in an attempt to provide more
conclusive results.
3 Experiment 1: Varied vignettes
In our first experiment, we developed a factorial design to look for effects of either
of the relevant variables—Judgment-Violation (JV) or Resolution-Violation (RV)—
on pre-theoretical judgments about cases potentially involving weakness of will.
The 97 subjects from around the University of California, Santa Barbara were
randomly assigned to be in one of the four conditions, yielding about 25 participants
in each.6
In the first condition, subjects were presented with a vignette in which an agent
(Newman) performs an action (eating donuts) that violates his judgment and
resolution.
Newman’s Diet (JV, RV):
Newman is worried about his weight. His doctor has told him he needs to lose
weight or he’ll likely die of a heart attack in the near future. In light of this,
Newman thinks it’s best to go on a diet and plans to do so. He stocks up on
healthier foods and buys a book on how to lose weight.
It’s two weeks into Newman’s diet, and he’s at work chewing on a carrot.
However, one of his co-workers brings in a large box of fresh donuts from the
local bakery, and Newman loves donuts; they’re his favorite. Even though he
has gone two whole weeks without eating any unhealthy food, like these
donuts, Newman succumbs to temptation and eats one each of his favorites.
Afterwards, he is riddled with guilt for going against what he thought was best
and had planned not to do.
Participants were then asked to indicate (on a Likert scale) their degree of
agreement or disagreement with the following claim: ‘‘Newman displays weakness
of will in eating the donuts.’’ Here we avoided using quantificational terms—such as
‘‘some’’ or ‘‘any’’—to avoid complications with weaker versus stronger claims as in
Mele’s studies. We also made the claim specifically about weakness of will with
respect to the action in question, rather than in the story in general, to avoid the first
problem noted with Mele’s design.
6 Subjects were predominantly between the ages of 18–24. Some were approached in a classroom setting
using paper surveys while others were solicited via email to participate in a web-based survey. The vast
majority were undergraduates at UC Santa Barbara. For the web-based version, appropriate measures
were taken to avoid automatic responses from robots, web crawlers, etc.
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Subjects in the second condition were presented with a scenario in which
Christabel performs an action (adultery) that is a violation of her judgment but not
any resolution.
Christabel’s Affair (JV,*RV):
Christabel, a happily married Victorian lady, is tempted to start an extra-
marital affair with William, a man she has recently met.
She knows it is likely to be disastrous. People are bound to find out, and it will
ruin her marriage and her reputation. Moreover, she considers it morally
wrong. So she thinks it’s not the best option. Nevertheless, she is not moved
by these considerations, and has planned to go ahead with it anyway.
When the weekend comes, Christabel follows through with her plan: she
sneaks out late at night, meets William, and they start an affair.
Participants were then asked to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement
with the following claim: ‘‘Christabel displays weakness of will in having the
affair.’’
For the third condition, subjects read a vignette in which the protagonist (Rocky)
performs an action that is consistent with his evaluative judgment but violates a
resolution of his.
Rocky’s Loss of Nerve (*JV, RV):
Rocky, who has promised his mother that he would never play tackle football,
has just been invited by some older boys to play in tomorrow’s game. Given
his promise to his mother, he thinks it would be best not to play. But he really
wants to, so he decides to play anyway.
However, when the time comes, Rocky suffers a failure of nerve. He doesn’t
show up for the game—not because he thinks it best not to play, but because
he’s afraid. He wouldn’t have played even if he had thought it best to do so.
Respondents were then asked to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement
with the following claim: ‘‘Rocky displays weakness of will in not showing up for
the game.’’
Subjects in the fourth condition were presented with a story in which a woman
(Kima) performs an action (adultery) that is neither a judgment- nor resolution-
violation.
Kima’s Affair (*JV, *RV):
Kima is working late at the office with her co-worker, Omar. As they joke
together about their relentless boss, she realizes she is greatly attracted to
Omar—both physically and intellectually.
Although Kima is married and her husband is good to her, she doesn’t much
care about his feelings. She thinks it would be best to just go ahead and seduce
Omar into having sexual intercourse. So she walks into Omar’s office and
carries out her plan to seduce him. Omar doesn’t take much persuading, and
they proceed with the affair.
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The participants were then asked to indicate their degree of agreement or
disagreement with the following claim: ‘‘Kima displays weakness of will in having
the affair.’’
Given this design, we can construe Mele’s and Holton’s views as competing
hypotheses. The first and last conditions are not in dispute; both hypotheses predict
relatively high levels of agreement in the first condition and disagreement on
average in the fourth condition. Despite this common ground on these cases,
including them will allow us to acquire a richer set of data and to compare any
statistically significant effects of the independent variables. What about the second
and third conditions? Mele’s disjunctive hypothesis should predict no significant
difference between them and that they will yield on average relatively high levels of
agreement with the relevant assertion (levels that near that of Condition 1). On the
other hand, Holton’s resolution hypothesis predicts at least that agreement will be
significantly higher in Condition 3 than in Condition 2 (given that the former
involves a resolution-violation while the latter doesn’t).
As a first pass at examining the results, we can consider the percentage of
subjects for each condition who either agreed, disagreed, or neither agreed nor
disagreed with the relevant statement. We scored responses in the reverse of the
order in which Mele did so that an increase in the number corresponds more
intuitively to an increase in agreement (so 7 is strongly agree while 1 is strongly
disagree). Grouping responses into the three categories of agree, disagree, or
neither, we found that a majority of participants (74%) in the first condition (JV,
RV) agreed that Newman displays weakness of will (by providing a response of
either 5, 6, or 7). This is precisely what we all should expect. Similarly, a majority
(63%) of subjects in the last condition (*JV, *RV) disagreed with the claim that
Kima displays weakness of will (by providing a response of 1, 2, or 3).7 The results
for the middle two cells indicate much weaker trends. In Condition 2 (JV, *RV),
50% of subjects agreed (to some extend or other) that Christabel displays weakness
of will, but 33% disagreed and 17% were ambivalent. Similarly, in Condition 3
(*JV, RV), 50% agreed that Rocky displays weakness of will, but 27% disagreed
and 23% were ambivalent.
Examining the mean score of responses in each condition, we find a similar trend.
Table 1 and Fig. 1 display means for each cell.
A statistical analysis of these data shows that there were two separate significant
effects for each variable.8 Participants tended to give higher ratings of agreement
7 It may seem quite odd that there isn’t a strong majority of participants providing the expected response
here, as there is in the first condition. But there are several plausible explanations of this, which aren’t
mutually exclusive. First, given that Kima does something many would likely consider immoral, some
subjects may have felt compelled to agree that Kima displays weakness of will simply to allocate the
stigma attached to it. Second, the expected response to Kima’s case involves rejecting the statement
presented, and there is some psychological evidence that we are more inclined to accept a proposition, at
least initially, than to reject it (Gilbert 1991). While this may explain the minor deviations here, it doesn’t
seem able to explain more drastic ones, such as those we observe in Mele’s Study 3a.
8 The data were subjected to a 2 (JV vs. *JV) 9 2 (RV vs. *RV) between-subjects analysis of variance
(ANOVA). There was a main effect of Judgment-Violation, F(1, 93) = 10.4, p \ .01, and a main effect
of Resolution-Violation, F(1, 93) = 8.9, p \ .01. There was no significant interaction effect. (Special
thanks to Joshua Knobe for assistance here.)
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when either variable was present. So these results certainly do count against
Holton’s resolution account given that both variables had a significant effect on
whether people thought a case involved weakness of will. This may appear initially
to show that the ordinary conception conforms to Mele’s disjunctive view—it
involves either a judgment-violation or a resolution-violation. However, a closer
look at the means indicates something more complex is going on.
As both hypotheses predict, and as we all should expect, there is relatively high
agreement with the attribution of weakness of will (or the exhibition of it) in
Newman’s case involving both kinds of violation. Similarly, it is no surprise that we
find disagreement on average in the final condition in which Kima doesn’t violate
her judgment or resolution at all. But the key results are in the middle two
conditions, and they may seem to support Mele’s hypothesis, especially since there
is no significant difference between these means.9 However, Mele should also
predict that the average level of agreement in the middle conditions would be
relatively high, at least close to the mean of Condition 1 (RV, JV). After all, if the
disjunctive account is true (i.e. if cases involving either kind of violation are
sufficient for exhibition of weakness of will according to ordinary folks), then we
would expect competent speakers to tend to agree with the relevant attribution. Yet
cases involving only judgment-violation or only resolution-violation produced
means very near the midpoint (neither agree nor disagree). So our subjects tended to
be neutral with respect to such cases. Likewise, a purely conjunctive view appears to
Fig. 1 Mean responses for Experiment 1
Table 1 Mean responses for
Experiment 1
RV *RV
JV 5.57 4.29
*JV 4.19 3.08
9 Confirmed by an independent samples t-test, t(48) = .173, p = .86.
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have a similar problem accounting for these results. It should predict that the middle
two conditions would yield means much closer to that of Condition 4 than we
found.
This indicates that neither Holton nor Mele were quite on the right track. When
both forms of violation are absent, our subjects tended to think the protagonist
doesn’t display weakness of will. But when both variables are present, they tended to
think the protagonist does display weakness of will. Given the ambivalence produced
in the middle two conditions, this suggests that while both variables may be necessary
for full, confident application of the concept, neither alone is sufficient. Perhaps then
we should think of the ordinary concept of weakness of will as a proto-type or cluster
concept (Rosch 1975). Contra both theorists, there doesn’t appear to be a simple
notion here with necessary and sufficient conditions for its application—disjunctive
or otherwise. Rather, each variable plays contributory roles in the application of the
concept of weakness of will. Each counts to some extent toward application of the
concept, but neither is sufficient on its own.10 We don’t want to commit ourselves to a
general proto-type theory of all concepts; but these data do provide some evidence
that the ordinary notion of weakness of will is operating this way.
One might object at this point that our vignettes in this experiment are not
uniform enough to isolate our two variables.11 After all, the vignettes do clearly
vary in topic (dieting, keeping a promise, and adultery). The various moral,
evaluative, and normative differences here may be cause for alarm. To address this
worry, we ran another experiment.
4 Experiment 2: Uniform vignettes
Our second experiment is the same in form as our first, differing only in some key
respects. First, we made the vignettes more uniform to see whether our previous
results could be replicated. We constructed four cases involving Carl, who has
always wanted to go skydiving, but who thinks, on the advice of his physician, that
it’s best he doesn’t. The vignettes differ on whether Carl resolves to go or resolves
not to, and on whether he ends up jumping. In the first he resolves not to go, and then
does jump (JV, RV); in the second he resolves to go and then does jump (JV,*RV);
in the third he resolves to go and then doesn’t jump (*JV, RV) and in the fourth he
resolves not to go and doesn’t jump (*JV, *RV). The full vignettes are included in
the Appendix. Here we not only made the cases as uniform as we could without
sacrificing natural-sounding stories, we also opted for a morally-neutral action (sky
diving) to ward off worries about the moral valence of the case having an
independent effect on subjects’ responses. Second, we attained a sample size that was
significantly larger (n = 274, about 68 responses per condition) and more diverse
(undergraduate students from a variety of disciplines and three different universities).
To ward off the uniformity objection to Experiment 1, and thus retain the support
for our proto-type account, we would ideally find the exact same results in
10 See Knobe and Preston-Roedder (2009) for similar results on the concept of valuing.
11 Thanks especially to Craig Roxborough for originally pressing us on this issue.
Weakness of will 351
123
Experiment 2 as we found in Experiment 1. However, that isn’t exactly the case. We
did again find that subjects were more likely to agree that Carl displayed weakness
of will when there was both resolution- and judgment-violation, less likely to when
neither of these factors held, and in between when just one held. But there was a
substantial difference from the results of the first experiment. Table 2 and Fig. 2
show the mean score for responses in the four conditions.
Figure 2 shows that the means for each condition in this experiment are about the
same relative to one another as they were in the first. But for each condition they
went down uniformly by about one point on the scale. This is fairly puzzling at first
because we should expect most people to at least agree that the first vignette (JV,
RV) involves weakness of will. But the mean is around 4.0 (neither agree nor
disagree). The most common score is 6 (moderately agree) but the mean is pulled
down to the midpoint by a sizable group of subjects providing a response of 2
(moderately disagree). So it looks as though there is a sub-group who are reading
the case in such a way that they don’t tend to think Carl displays weakness of will in
jumping, even though he thought it was best not to and resolved not to do it.
Likewise, a statistical analysis of the data shows that the two variables had a
significant effect on subjects’ responses.12 So, again, contra Holton’s resolution
Table 2 Mean responses for
Experiment 2
RV *RV
JV 4.01 3.00
*JV 3.54 2.00
Fig. 2 Mean responses for Experiment 2
12 The data were subjected to a 2 (JV vs. *JV) 9 2 (RV vs. *RV) between-subjects ANOVA. There
was a main effect of Judgment-Violation, F(1, 270) = 11.4, p \ .01, and a main effect of Resolution-
Violation, F(1, 270) = 34.3, p \ .01. There was no significant interaction effect.
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hypothesis, both variables are significantly affecting people’s attributions of
weakness of will. These data may seem to lend some support to the resolution
account, given that the mean response for the case involving a resolution-violation
but no judgment-violation is higher than the mean response for the case involving
judgment-violation but no resolution-violation (3.54 vs. 3.00). However, these
differences are not significant.13
What could explain these rather odd results? We might suspect this shows that
different people were picking up on different features of the cases, and so these data
don’t reflect anything about the ordinary conception of weakness of will. But many
subjects who filled out the optional portion of the survey asking for an explanation
of their response did seem to be picking up on the relevant notion of weakness of
will. For example, in the fourth condition (*JV, *RV), a large number of
participants disagreed with the claim that Carl displayed weakness of will, as we
would expect. And those who provided explanations for that choice very frequently
referenced something like Carl’s sticking to what he chose to do, not succumbing to
temptation, and so on. Another factor that may have played a role in driving down
agreement is the fact that Carl is exhibiting courage in jumping out of a plane,
which to some may have seemed odd to describe as a case of weakness.14 This
alone, though, wouldn’t uniformly explain the drop in agreement since in two of the
four cases Carl doesn’t actually jump (and so doesn’t exhibit courage). But it
certainly could be playing some role as well. We suspected, then, that perhaps the
difference in results is at least partly due to our opting for morally-neutral cases. To
test this explanation, we ran another experiment.
5 Experiment 3: Valence
In our final study, we wanted to test whether the moral valence of the case affected
subjects’ attributions of weakness of will. Since we wanted to explain the results of
Experiment 2, we needed to determine which aspects of Carl’s case could have been
morally infused. Ultimately, what Carl intended to do and what he ended up doing
in the cases of succumbing (either going or refraining from sky diving) were fairly
morally neutral—or, more broadly, normatively and evaluatively neutral.15 So we
set out to look for effects of the moral valence of either the intention or the action.
To this end, we developed another factorial design with two variables: Action-
Valence (either neutral or bad) and Intention-Valence (either neutral or bad). We
developed four uniform vignettes accordingly. Each one involved Phil, who is either
resolving to read some French literature (neutral) or some Nazi literature (bad) and
succumbing to either go with his friends to drunkenly bully people (bad) or watch a
13 Confirmed by an independent samples t-test, t(134.7) = -1.69, p = .094.
14 Thanks especially to Al Mele for raising this potential explanation.
15 In some cases, Carl did go against the advice of his physician by skydiving (though perhaps not
intentionally under that description). And this is perhaps a violation of a norm. (Jonathan Way helpfully
raised this issue.) But we submit that this is at least much less normatively infused than the relevant
scenarios in our third experiment.
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movie (neutral). In each case, Phil judges some course of action best, resolves to do
it, but eventually succumbs. Here are the four, quite uniform, and rather concise
cases (emphasis has been added here in order to make the differences more explicit):
Case 1: Neutral Intention and Neutral Action (NI, NA)
Phil has recently joined a French class. He is deeply committed to the class and to
what they are trying to achieve, though he tends to put off reading the classic
French texts that the teacher insists they all study. He finds them a bit of a drag.
This evening he has resolved to stay home and read some of the texts. But some
friends call up and try to persuade him to come out with them. If things go as
normal they’ll have a pizza and watch a movie. He thinks it would be better to
stay home and read as planned, but he gives in and goes with them.
Case 2: Neutral Intention and Bad Action (NI, BA)
Phil has recently joined a French class. He is deeply committed to the class and to
what they are trying to achieve, though he tends to put off reading the classic
French texts that the teacher insists they all study. He finds them a bit of a drag.
This evening he has resolved to stay home and read some of the texts. But some
friends call up and try to persuade him to come out with them. If things go as
normal they’ll hang out at the mall, have rather too many beers, and pick fights
with some of the local immigrant kids. He thinks it would be better to stay home
and read as planned, but he gives in and goes with them.
Case 3: Bad Intention and Neutral Action (BI, NA)
Phil has recently joined a Neo-Nazi group. He is deeply committed to the group
and to what they are trying to achieve, though he tends to put off reading the
classic Nazi texts that the group leader insists they all study. He finds them a bit
of a drag.
This evening he has resolved to stay home and read some of the texts. But some
friends call up and try to persuade him to come out with them. If things go as
normal they’ll have a pizza and watch a movie. He thinks it would be better to
stay home and read as planned, but he gives in and goes with them.
Case 4: Bad Intention and Bad Action (BI, BA)
Phil has recently joined a Neo-Nazi group. He is deeply committed to the group
and to what they are trying to achieve, though he tends to put off reading the
classic Nazi texts that the group leader insists they all study. He finds them a bit
of a drag.
This evening he has resolved to stay home and read some of the texts. But some
friends call up and try to persuade him to come out with them. If things go as
normal they’ll hang out at the mall, have rather too many beers, and pick fights
with some of the local immigrant kids. He thinks it would be better to stay home
and read as planned, but he gives in and goes with them.
Each vignette was randomly assigned to one of 117 undergraduate students in a
Critical Thinking course at the University of California, Santa Barbara, yielding
about 30 subjects per condition. After reading the vignette, participants recorded
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their degree of agreement or disagreement with the following claim: ‘‘Phil displays
weakness of will in going with his friends.’’ Table 3 and Fig. 3 show the mean score
for each condition using the same Likert scale as in the previous experiments.
As Fig. 3 demonstrates, the mean response for each condition is, as we would
expect, above the midpoint. So subjects on the whole tended to agree in each case
that Phil displays weakness of will. Moreover, an analysis of the data revealed a
significant effect of the Action-Valence variable such that subjects are more inclined
to agree with the attribution of weakness of will when the valence of the action the
agent ends up succumbing to perform is bad as opposed to neutral.16 Surprisingly,
there was no corresponding effect found for the Intention-Valence variable and
there was no interaction effect. Figure 3 displays this well. The responses were
higher in the conditions in which the action was bad (i.e. the second and fourth
cases). When the valence of the action is neutral, the mean response is around 5
(slightly agree). When the valence of the action becomes bad, the mean jumps to
around 6 (moderately agree).
We think these results help explain those of Experiment 2. They provide an
explanation of why we found such low levels of agreement, even though we
achieved the same spread, so to speak, from Experiment 1. This, we submit,
provides a substantial case against the objection to Experiment 1 based on lack of
Table 3 Mean responses for
Experiment 3
Intention-Valence (I) Action-Valence (A)
Neutral (NA) Bad (BA)
Neutral (NI) 5.23 5.73
Bad (BI) 4.89 5.52
Fig. 3 Mean responses for Experiment 3
16 F(1, 113) = 4.10, p = .045. Confirmed by a 2 (bad intention versus neutral intention) 9 2 (bad action
versus neutral action) between-subjects ANOVA.
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uniformity. Experiment 3 suggests that at least one key reason we didn’t find higher
levels of agreement in Experiment 2 is due to our use of a more morally neutral
case. Presumably a more morally infused case would bump up the spread, which
would replicate the results of Experiment 1, and so help to support our initial proto-
type account of the ordinary concept of weakness of will. Of course, some of the
cases in Experiment 1 didn’t exactly have a moral valence—it seems a bit of a
stretch to think of a failure to maintain a diet as a moral failure. But the actions they
performed did all end up violating some clear norm or amount to something we’d
expect the average person to consider bad, though not necessarily morally bad. And
that’s the general kind of valence we’re concerned with—i.e. normative/evaluative,
broadly speaking, which is what many have found as the general factor in
phenomena like the Knobe effect (see e.g. Pettit and Knobe 2009). That is, the kinds
of factors that appear to have such a pervasive impact on so much of our thinking
isn’t specific to morality, but rather to violating norms more generally.17
In addition to supporting our proto-type account, the results of Experiment 3 are
independently interesting. They indicate that normative or evaluative considerations
affect people’s judgments about whether an agent is being weak-willed. We’re not
sure what to make of this additional finding. While odd in certain respects, there is a
wealth of data indicating that normative and evaluative considerations affect our
application of various notions (Pettit and Knobe 2009).
6 Conclusion
The results of our first experiment provide some evidence that neither Holton’s
resolution account nor Mele’s disjunctive account were quite correct. Instead, a
proto-type account of the ordinary concept of weakness of will seems to best explain
the data. After all, in Experiment 1, both types of violation were required for the
mean response to be well above the midpoint. And the means for the two cases in
which only one type of violation was present (judgment or resolution), were near the
midpoint of ‘‘neither agree nor disagree.’’ Moreover, the proto-type account is
consistent with the results of Experiment 3. In all four vignettes, participants tended
to agree that weakness of will was displayed by the protagonist, but both types of
violation were also present.
However, Experiment 1 is open to the criticism that our vignettes didn’t isolate
the two variables at issue. Experiment 2 was developed in an attempt to address this
problem. Though we failed to find the exact same results as in our first experiment,
we hypothesized that this was due to the lack of significantly normative or
evaluative valence of the cases. Experiment 3 provided some confirmation of this
hypothesis. Experiment 2 was meant primarily to ward off an objection to our
conclusion from Experiment 1. It didn’t fully, but we think supplementing it with
the results of Experiment 3 does, and this protects our initial tentative conclusion
from Experiment 1. However, Experiment 3 also has the independently interesting
17 For an attempt to explain the Knobe effect along these lines, see Holton (2010).
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finding that the valence of the action, but not the intention, does affect at least
people’s confidence in their attributions of weakness of will.18
So what should we conclude from this? What in the world is the ordinary concept
of weakness of will? Holton indeed should be much less confident in the existence
of an ordinary notion of weakness of will that only involves resolution-violations.
Furthermore, our results indicate that focusing on either resolution-violations or
judgment-violations (or both) exclusively isn’t quite right. The normative valence of
the action seems to play a role just as the other two variables do and in a
contributory rather than a classical way. While we shouldn’t consider the matter
closed based on a few experiments, a proto-type account does provide a good
explanation of the current data.
Of course, one might object to our entire project here on the grounds that looking
for an ordinary concept of weakness of will is rather dubious or even perverse.19
While we’re sympathetic to this worry, we have two things to say in response. First,
regardless of whether we should be concerned as theorists about how ordinary folks
use the term ‘‘weakness of will,’’ philosophers have often either explicitly or
implicitly had a keen interest in the ordinary notion by considering judgments about
hypothetical cases.20 Second, our data do seem to indicate that there is a real notion
here. After all, significant majorities of people in our studies clustered around
agreement or disagreement with the attribution of weakness of will depending on
some of the very factors that we would expect. If there were no real ordinary notion,
we would expect much more erratic and puzzling data.
Finally, what does this mean for theorists interested in weakness of will? Does it
matter whether philosophers employing the phrase are theorizing about something
that has straightforward necessary and sufficient conditions for its application and is
independent of normative or evaluative considerations? It depends on the theorist.
Some clearly take ‘‘weakness of will’’ to be a term of art which picks out a certain
phenomenon they’re interested in, such as judgment-violation. Davidson (1970)
may be an example. Others, however, are concerned with the folk notion of
weakness of will. Either way, perhaps we can at least conclude this: we should be
clear about whether we are interested in the ordinary notion of weakness of will, or
just judgment-violations, or just resolution-violations, or something else entirely.
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Appendix: Vignettes for Experiment 2
The differences between these cases are italicized to help the reader see them. But,
of course, the vignettes given to subjects did not contain any emphasis.
Vignette 1 (JV, RV)
For as long as he can remember, Carl has wanted to have a go at skydiving. A
couple of colleagues at work are also keen, and together they discuss signing up for
a course. He is excited about the possibility, and understandably a little anxious.
However, when he mentions the possibility to his doctor, he is advised, given his
medical history, not to do it. He is very disappointed, but thinking it over reluctantly
concludes that his doctor is right: the best thing would be to let his friends go
without him.
Still, in Carl’s mind that doesn’t close the matter. He still finds the idea of
jumping terribly exciting. His doctor hasn’t actually forbidden him to go, and he
doesn’t need a medical certificate from him. When his friends encourage him to sign
up for the course, he seriously considers doing so, even though he still thinks that,
given the health concerns, it would be best not to. Finally he resolves not to go.
When the first day of the course comes, Carl’s friends call him to say that there is
an empty place and urge him to come. Despite his earlier resolution, Carl gives in
and goes with them. He completes the preliminary training, and makes his first
jump.
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: ‘‘Carl displays weakness of will in jumping.’’
Vignette 2 (JV, *RV)
For as long as he can remember, Carl has wanted to have a go at skydiving. A
couple of colleagues at work are also keen, and together they discuss signing up for
a course. He is excited about the possibility, and understandably a little anxious.
However, when he mentions the possibility to his doctor, he is advised, given his
medical history, not to do it. He is very disappointed, but thinking it over reluctantly
concludes that his doctor is right: the best thing would be to let his friends go
without him.
Still, in Carl’s mind that doesn’t close the matter. He still finds the idea of
jumping terribly exciting. His doctor hasn’t actually forbidden him to go, and he
doesn’t need a medical certificate from him. When his friends encourage him to sign
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up for the course, he seriously considers doing so, even though he still thinks that,
given the health concerns, it would be best not to. Finally he resolves to sign up
anyway.
When the first day of the course comes, Carl gets increasingly anxious about the
jump. As he goes through the preliminary training, he starts to wonder whether he
will have the nerve to jump, but he repeats to himself his resolution to go through
with it. When the time of the jump finally arrives, he is terrified. Nevertheless, he
manages to jump.
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: ‘‘Carl displays weakness of will in jumping.’’
Vignette 3 (*JV, RV)
For as long as he can remember, Carl has wanted to have a go at skydiving. A
couple of colleagues at work are also keen, and together they discuss signing up for
a course. He is excited about the possibility, and understandably a little anxious.
However, when he mentions the possibility to his doctor, he is advised, given his
medical history, not to do it. He is very disappointed, but thinking it over reluctantly
concludes that his doctor is right: the best thing would be to let his friends go
without him.
Still, in Carl’s mind that doesn’t close the matter. He still finds the idea of
jumping terribly exciting. His doctor hasn’t actually forbidden him to go, and he
doesn’t need a medical certificate from him. When his friends encourage him to sign
up for the course, he seriously considers doing so, even though he still thinks that,
given the health concerns, it would be best not to. Finally he resolves to sign up
anyway.
When the first day of the course comes, Carl gets increasingly anxious about the
jump. As he goes through the preliminary training, he starts to wonder whether he
will have the nerve to jump, but he repeats to himself his resolution to go through
with it. When the time of the jump finally arrives, he is terrified. He finds that he is
just too scared to jump. He remains in the plane, and returns to the airfield.
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: ‘‘Carl displays weakness of will in not jumping.’’
Vignette 4 (*JV, *RV)
For as long as he can remember, Carl has wanted to have a go at skydiving. A
couple of colleagues at work are also keen, and together they discuss signing up for
a course. He is excited about the possibility, and understandably a little anxious.
However, when he mentions the possibility to his doctor, he is advised, given his
medical history, not to do it. He is very disappointed, but thinking it over reluctantly
concludes that his doctor is right: the best thing would be to let his friends go
without him.
Still, in Carl’s mind that doesn’t close the matter. He still finds the idea of
jumping terribly exciting. His doctor hasn’t actually forbidden him to go, and he
doesn’t need a medical certificate from him. When his friends encourage him to sign
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up for the course, he seriously considers doing so, even though he still thinks that,
given the health concerns, it would be best not to. Finally he resolves not to go.
When the first day of the course comes, Carl’s friends call him to say that there is
an empty place and urge him to come. But Carl is firm; he remains at home while
his friends jump.
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: ‘‘Carl displays weakness of will in not jumping.’’
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